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Abstract  
Authors    Carl Egerlundh and Peter Ihre 
Tutor   Associate Professor Patrik Ström 
Title Can corporate-cultural differences affect the outcome of M&A?  - A study of 
the DaimlerChrysler merger. 
Problem In a globalizing world, companies increasingly operate across borders and 
cultures. In order to remain competitive, the importance of cultural knowledge 
becomes evident. At the same time, the rules are changing; in the automotive 
industry, for instance, the number of independent manufacturers has decreased 
as firms come together in order to benefit from new growth possibilities, 
improved international range and shared technology etc. This consolidation 
process has resulted in a number of mergers and acquisitions throughout the 
industry. As we have a closer look at the specific case of the DaimlerChrysler 
merger and its actual outcome, the impact of cultural differences, both from 
national and corporate perspectives, is of great interest to us. Did corporate-
cultural differences affect the outcome of the merger? What could have been 
done prior to the merger to minimize culture related differences? And in 
general, what are the potential problems of cultural differences in merger and 
acquisitions? 
Aim The main aim of this study is to analyze the potential impact of corporate 
cultural differences in merger and acquisitions and in particular in the case of 
the DaimlerChrysler merger that was implemented in 1998. 
Limitations We will focus our efforts on the impact of corporate cultural issues in merger 
and acquisitions in relation to the DaimlerChrysler case.  
Method This is a qualitative case study. Qualitative methods are generally concerned 
with interpretation, holistic understanding, which we find the most suitable for 
our research.  
Findings There are a few main conclusions of this thesis. We identified three 
particularly important problem areas in relation to corporate cultural 
differences in M&A: decision making, objectives and motivational factors. It is 
our conclusion that corporate cultural issues were underestimated during the 
initial parts of the merger and that a more thorough integration process along 
with an accurate culture-focused pre-merger analysis could have minimized the 
culture-related difficulties within DaimlerChrysler.  
Suggestions For further research, we suggest more focus on the three problem areas 
identified in this study. That means deeper knowledge of the impact of 
corporate cultural differences concerning decision making, objectives and 
motivational factors  
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1. Introduction 
The following section gives the general background to the subject and highlights why the 
authors have chosen to study the corporate cultural aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A) and in particular the case of DaimlerChrysler.  
1.2 Background 
As companies increasingly find themselves working across borders, the importance of cultural 
knowledge becomes evident. Failing to understand the complex relationship between culture 
and business equals falling behind competitors. Today, cultural knowledge is power, and in 
turn, companies and organizations that master the modern networks and strong cross cultural 
relationships, will be immensely competitive. They will never underestimate the importance 
of cultural differences in business, both from corporate and national perspectives. These 
companies work to understand and adapt to the multicultural context in which competitors 
and partners operate.  
Globalization means constant change. The business environment changes, new industries 
arise, new companies are established, and some fail while others succeed. In order to cope 
with the ever changing conditions of a global market, some organizations come together to 
benefit from size, geographical expansion, research and technology. In international business, 
these transactions are often in the form of mergers and acquisitions. As mentioned above, the 
reason behind merger and acquisitions is often to gain from the numerous potential benefits 
such a transaction presents. However, research shows that a majority of mergers and 
acquisitions actually fail to achieve the expected synergies. Naturally, such a complex 
process, and the reasons behind its failure cannot be explained simply by referring to culture-
related problems, the variables interacting are countless. But the importance of corporate 
cultural issues related to merger and acquisitions must not be underestimated. In this thesis, 
our aim is to find out more about the potential effects of corporate cultural differences in 
merger and acquisitions.  
Today, globalization is essential to almost every industry. One industry, which bears a 
significant historical importance and that has experienced substantial change over the years, is 
the automotive industry. Over the past thirty years, the automotive industry has seen a rapid 
decrease in its number of independent manufacturers. This consolidation process, which 
originated in the benefits of shared technological solutions, growth possibilities and mass 
production, has resulted in a number of mergers and acquisitions throughout the industry.  
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Naturally, these transactions have included companies from diverse parts of the world and of 
different corporate and national culture.  
In the late nineties, the merger between German Daimler-Benz and American Chrysler 
attracted a huge amount of attention.  It was hyped as the perfect marriage, both sides would 
gain from geographical distribution, car models would supplement each other and production 
of scale and common research and development meant huge potential savings. The merger 
ended up being a disaster. Evidently, very early on, DaimlerChrysler experienced problems in 
direct connection with corporate culture differences. In retrospect, these differences were 
badly managed. A fact that leaves us with an interesting problem: First of all, did corporate 
cultural differences affect the outcome of the merger? Secondly, could anything have been 
done to minimize the culture related difficulties within the company prior to the merger?  
1.3 Research Question 
From a corporate cultural perspective, what are the potential problems of cultural differences 
in mergers & acquisitions? 
1.4 Sub question 
In the DaimlerChrysler case, what effects did the corporate cultural differences have on the 
outcome of the merger? 
What could have been done to minimize culture-related difficulties within DaimlerChrysler 
prior to the merger? 
1.5 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the potential impact of corporate cultural-related 
differences in mergers and acquisitions and in particular in the case of DaimlerChrysler. 
Furthermore, our study seeks to examine whether there is a connection between the outcome 
of the merger and corporate cultural differences of the two companies. If our investigation 
concerning corporate cultural differences within DaimlerChrysler, both from theoretical and 
practical perspectives, supports the theory of a potential impact, we want to analyze what 
precautionary actions could have been performed in order to minimize damage. Naturally, a 
comparison between actual cultural integration procedures and theoretically supported 
procedures becomes essential in order to fulfill our purpose. The study could also serve as a 
strong foundation for our further examinations of corporate culture, which is an area of 
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particular interest to us. Furthermore, it is of great interest to us to be able to follow a 
transaction of such historical value and substantial size, from such a close range.      
1.6 Delimitations 
This thesis will focus solely on corporate cultural issues even though we are aware of the 
significant impact general culture pose on the evolution of corporate culture. However, since 
culture as a general expression is of such great importance, it will be discussed in the 
theoretical framework, but not in the analysis. It is simply too large and complex for a thesis 
of this kind. We further limit ourselves to one case, since it would be too extensive to analyze 
other mergers in a study of this type. Regarding the DaimlerChrysler case, we will limit our 
analysis to the corporate cultural aspects of the merger and its possible impact on the end 
result. Still, we find the subject interesting and consider it to be a potential topic for future 
study.  
1.7 Research design 
 
2. Method: 
In this part of the thesis we describe our methodological approach when investigating the 
subject. It describes and evaluates our applied method, the initial planning process, collection 
of data, and our research approach. Furthermore, it will discuss reliability, validity and scope 
of the study. 
3. The Theoretical Framework: 
The framework aims to provide the reader with a necessary foundation that will contribute to 
a thorough understanding of corporate cultural issues in M&A. M&A are discussed in 
general, followed by an in depth description of culture to lay the ground to a further 
explanation of corporate culture, cross-cultural management and theory on cultural issues in 
M&A. 
4. The DaimlerChrysler Case Description: 
The case description is created to first overview the Automotive industry at that time as a 
whole, in order to further understand the environment in which Daimler and Chrysler were 
operating. Furthermore, a short description of the two companies is given before the actual 
merger and its course of events will be presented.  
5.The Analysis: 
In the analytical chapter of the thesis, the different parts of the theoretical framework will be 
discussed, compared and put in relation to the actual process and outcome of the 
DaimlerChrysler merger.  
6. Conclusions: 
The last part of the thesis will simply focus on answering the research question and the two 
sub questions presented in the introduction chapter.  
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2. Method 
In this part of the thesis we describe our methodological approach when investigating the 
subject. It describes and evaluates our applied method, the initial planning process, collection 
of data, and our research approach. Furthermore, it will discuss reliability, validity and scope 
of the study. 
2.1 Planning process 
There is already a substantial number of studies and extensive literature analyzing the subject 
of corporate culture, both in general terms but also in connection with M&A. The Daimler-
Chrysler merger showed to be extensively covered in reliable contemporary media, providing 
us with substantial archival material and in turn a detailed timeline of actual events.  
As we initiated this project, beginning with the collection of qualitative data, it was clear to us 
that a thorough and ambitious selection process was a necessity in order to find adequate 
accurate material.  Firstly, we screened archival material of finance branch media, tracing 
coverage back thirteen years and all the way to the separation of Daimler-Chrysler in 2009. 
Secondly, we collected and reviewed literature discussing culture in general, corporate 
culture, cross-cultural management and culture in M&A, in order to establish a conception of 
theoretical framework. Thirdly, from the collection of research material, we formulated and 
defined the problem and purpose. Last, the methodological process with problem formulation 
and actual aim was discussed with our tutor.  
2.2 Evaluation of Research Approach and Methods 
The method used in this thesis is of a qualitative nature since “quantitative research can not 
deal with the social and cultural constructions of its own variables” (Eriksson, et al, 2008: 4). 
Qualitative and quantitative research can sometimes be hard to distinguish. However, 
qualitative methods are generally concerned with interpretation, holistic understanding and 
focused on structured, standardized and theoretical ways of collecting and analyzing data 
(Eriksson, et al, 2008). The thesis is based on social and cultural constructions under certain 
circumstances and a qualitative method is therefore inevitable.   
There are several possible approaches when choosing a method of qualitative nature; 
however, after discussions, a case study research seemed to be the best choice. “Case study 
research is presented as a research strategy when addressing complex organizational, 
managerial and other business issues, which are considered difficult to study with quantitative 
methodologies” (Eriksson, et al, 2008: 116). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) further state that 
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the common view on case study research is the focus on the “production of detailed and 
holistic knowledge” (Eriksson, et al, 2008: 117). The end product should be based on various 
empirical sources; it should also contain diversity and complexity (Eriksson, et al, 2008). 
When constructing a successful case study the authors ought to provide the reader with a 
multi-approach view of the situation. However, the writers need a well-formulated problem 
and limitations in order to reach this target (Bell, 1999).      
2.3 The Collection and Presentation of Data 
Qualitative data have been used in order to execute our study and the sources are of secondary 
nature. Secondary data can be defined as information that have been publicized and 
interpreted (Nyberg, 2000). Initially, information regarding M&A was studied in order to get 
an overall understanding of the problems that generally occur in such situations. The objective 
was to find previous studies and theoretical frameworks that were applicable to our thesis. 
The theoretical frameworks were mainly found through databases and books. Google Scholar 
and the university library have been frequently used. Repeatedly used key words to retrieve 
data have been “Cross cultural management”, “Corporate culture in M&A”, “Corporate 
cultural differences in M&A” ,etc. Data regarding Daimler and Chrysler were mainly 
collected from academic journals, newspaper articles and books addressing the 
DaimlerChrysler merger.  
The DaimlerChrysler merger has previously been analyzed and studied extensively. The 
problem has been to scan and extract the most relevant data for the thesis. Initially, in order to 
gain understanding of the DaimlerChrysler merger, we looked at media archives with articles 
addressing the specific case. However, the deeper insight of the sequence of events was 
achieved through studying the books Taken for a ride (Vlasic, et al, 2000) and Wheels on fire 
(Waller, 2001), which in chronological order describe the course of events in the 
DaimlerChrysler merger. The books are written by journalists working at the Detroit News 
and Financial Times Germany, and based on various interviews with stakeholders, secondary 
accounts in acknowledged newspapers and other literature concerning the specific case. 
However, they only concern the merger until 2000 and 2001 which left a gap in the merger 
timeline. This issue was relatively easy to solve since this particular merger is very well 
covered by newspaper articles and academic journals, which the authors have used to fill in 
the blanks.       
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The theoretical framework has been divided into two parts; first, to lay out the foundation of 
culture, in order gain a deeper understanding of the cultural theories in M&A. Culture is a 
term which is hard to define. Hence, the primary goal was to establish a definition of the term 
culture and ultimately corporate culture. There are a few definitions of culture that are 
generally accepted by the public, but the one described by Kroeber and Kluckhohn is 
considered essential. To gain further knowledge about culture, for example, what forms 
culture, cultural diversity, corporate culture and cross cultural management, we have read 
numerous articles and books that shares various views on the respective subjects. In order to 
understand corporate culture in M&A, we have studied several theories on cultural issues in 
M&A. To further widen our understanding, several reports have been studied, e.g. PWC 
conducted one study about M&A, its benefits and reasons for failure. The reports were based 
on different surveys in which investors and analysts answered questions about M&A (PWC 
study, 2011).    
2.4 Validity and Reliability 
Validity defines to what degree a study actually measures what it aims to measure (Eriksson 
and Wiedersheim, 2001). Reliability on the other hand, is the way a study consistently 
performs the same result in repeated trials. That is, the certainty and occurrence of 
unsystematic errors in a used method (Esaiason et al, 2007). We have collected data in a 
consistent and systematic way throughout this study. This is a subject that has been 
thoroughly studied, which contributes to the reliability of information. Information regarding 
the merger has been collected from reliable sources that have frequently been cited and 
articles from academic journals and newspapers such as the Economist, etc. However, the use 
of secondary data puts pressure on the researcher to verify the accuracy of the information if 
the thesis wants to be considered as valid and credible. Our main sources, Taken for a ride 
(Vlasic, et al, 2000) and Wheels on fire (Waller, 2001) are based on interviews and secondary 
data and could therefore be considered as unreliable. However, as mentioned earlier, since the 
authors have a quite credible background at recognized newspapers, we have decided to 
consider them as accurate, valid and credible. Further evidence to that statement is that both 
books are in accordance and at the same time independent from each other. The other main 
sources the researchers have used such as, Holden (2002), Steers, et al, (2010), and Gertsen et 
al. (1998) are frequently quoted which further contributes to a high credibility. If another 
investigator were to follow our procedures as described and conducted the same case study 
again, they would arrive at the same conclusions and result.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
In this thesis, our aim is to understand the importance and effect of corporate culture in 
mergers & acquisitions, specifically concerning the automobile industry. Hence, our 
theoretical framework must include past and present research in order to get a basic 
understanding of M&A, culture, and in particular, corporate culture.  
3.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
During different periods of time, the world has experienced a substantial number of M&A. 
Evidently, when organic growth is not an option, companies find consolidation as a natural 
way of achieving continued growth. One M&A usually follow another and the 
DaimlerChrysler case was no different. In 1998, the world was basically experiencing a 
merger explosion. Exxon and Mobil fused just a couple of months after British Petroleum 
acquired Amoco. Citicorp merged with Travels Group right before BankAmerica joined 
NationsBank. The telecommunications companies merged like no other business; AT&T 
joined TCI, Bell Atlantic Corp. fused with GTE and SBC Communications bought Ameritech 
(Vlasic et al. 2000).   
Mergers & Acquisitions are terms generally considered to be identical phenomenas. However, 
they are products of different legal transactions. A merger is defined as the transaction of all 
assets to one company or by two or more companies joining together into one new entity. An 
acquisition on the other hand is executed when one company invests in a majority of the 
stocks and through that controls the acquired company. Hence, the power relations are clearer 
in an acquisition due to the more dominant acquiring partner (Gertsen et al. 1998). 
There are many reasons for a company to engage in M&A; the home market is saturated, the 
need of quick access to foreign markets, synergy effects, political constraints, competition 
with other companies, quick growth, etc. The event of a merger or an acquisition could be 
very effective for both parts if it is conducted the right way and if integration is successful. 
However, M&A often produce disappointing end results and do not live up to the 
expectations, although there are various underlying reasons for them. Historically, numerous 
studies have been conducted with the aim of examining whether or not M&A are successful 
with the general conclusion that in most cases, the companies fail to increase shareholder 
value, fail to achieve expected revenue synergies and even destroy value. There are many 
underlying reasons: Firstly, the acquiring firms frequently seem to overpay the assets of the 
acquired firm. If there is more than one company interested, prices tend to increase. 
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Moreover, a recurring problem the management of an acquiring company experiences is the 
optimism regarding the value that can be created though an acquisition. This generally 
generates a premium well above the acquired company’s market capitalization. A 
contributory factor is the fact that managers tend to exaggerate their own ability to create 
value in an M&A and are therefore willing to pay above the actual value. The importance of 
cultural differences often becomes obvious after the M&A and is in many cases neglected in 
the pre-analysis by the two companies. Clashes in culture usually lead to discontent and can 
generate a high management and employee turnover. As mentioned before, one of the main 
reasons for M&A is the creation of synergies. However, slow integration of the companies 
due to various difficulties such as difference in culture, corporate culture and management 
style are usually reasons for failure in realizing synergy effects. Also, the delay in realization 
of synergies is often pointed out as a reason for failure in M&A. Finally, inadequate analyze 
of the benefits and cost savings prior to the M&A also largely contribute to the success rate 
being embarrassingly low (Hill, 2009).   
3.2 Culture 
When studying the complicated meaning and the many definitions of culture, it is necessary 
to, as far as possible, focus our efforts on the core factors specific to the case. For instance, in 
the automotive industry, there are certain important aspects to the conditions of the 
organizational culture in relation to the national culture that must be noticed. The great car 
manufactures tend to hold strong financial and cultural positions at home, often gaining from 
protectionist governmental behavior. In Sweden, through the recent turbulence surrounding 
SAAB there has been substantial governmental involvement. When Daimler initiated 
preparations to merge with Chrysler, it was essential for the company to have government 
support and to keep top politicians involved. Examples are numerous. The future of a 
company with such a strong heritage and of significant cultural importance is simply of 
national interest. It affects economy, job possibilities, national identity and the industry in 
general. Hence, it becomes essential to closely observe the potential impact of national culture 
on the outcome of a cross-cultural transaction of this kind.  
Research concerning national and organizational culture very often includes individualism or 
collectivism as important factors. Do individuals of a society see themselves primarily as 
members of a group or as individuals? Or are societal goals more important than individual 
goals? What are their cultural manifestations? In business, how important are actual contracts 
compared to strong relationships? (Steers, et al, 2010). One must wonder if it is actually 
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possible to generalize on a culture using such broad expressions. And, if cultural differences 
between certain groups are seemingly small, is it necessarily easier to deal or cooperate with 
each other?  
There are clearly numerous questions about the meaning and function of culture. This chapter 
will discuss the general meaning of culture through several definitions, their differences and 
the potential problem in relation to the obvious tendencies of generalization. We will also 
discuss corporate culture and cross cultural management and lastly the cultural issues of 
mergers & acquisitions.  
3.2.1 Defining Culture 
As a word or expression, culture is one of the most complex ones in the English language 
(Holden, 2002). Of the many definitions, one of the most widespread and quoted is by 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn who in 1952 defined culture thus:  
“Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behavior acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including 
their embodiments in artifacts: the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., 
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems 
may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action; on the other, as conditioning 
elements of future action” (Steers, et al, 2010: 21). 
However, a shorter, perhaps even more celebrated definition is from Hofstede (1980), who 
defines culture as follows:  
“The collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the member of one human 
group from another…the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influences a 
human group’s response to its environment.”  (Hofstede, 2005: 14) 
Although Hofstede is certainly one of the most influential figures within culture-related 
research, there are scholars that take on slightly different approaches to culture. For instance, 
Sociologist Ann Swidler works from the idea of culture as a problem-solving toolkit of 
symbols, stories, rituals and worldviews that help people of a culture survive and succeed 
(Steers, et al, 2010). Anthropologist Clifford Getz defines culture as the means by which 
people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about attitudes towards life 
(Steers, et al, 2010). Although the difference is minor, it could still serve as an indication of a 
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possible development in the area of culture research and support the idea of culture as a non 
static phenomenon.    
3.2.2 Cultural Manifestations 
Basically, culture tells us what is acceptable and what is not. In every person there is a pattern 
of thoughts, feelings and certain ways of acting formed throughout the individual’s lifetime.  
A large part of this formation process is directly linked to early childhood, a time when 
human beings are highly receptive to learning and adaption. These patterns, which Hofstede 
describes as “mental programmes”, derive from the social environments in which we grow up 
and gain experience. Culture is always something collective, it is absorbed in the social 
environment and it defines the unwritten rules of the social game. To an individual, culture is 
learned; it is not in your genes and can not be related to human nature or individual 
personality (Hofstede, 2005). Cultural differences are expressed very differently. Hofstede 
(2005) basically describes different cultural manifestations through four levels, Symbols, 
Heroes, Rituals and Values.  
Symbols basically define the gestures, words, objects or pictures of certain importance to the 
people within the culture. These factors are usually not deeply embedded within the culture 
but actually changeable and replaceable. On the next level, Hofstede places the heroes. These 
are persons with attributes highly valued within a culture; they are basically role models, dead 
or alive, real or fictive. Rituals are activities regarded as important within a culture. It can be 
ways of greeting each other or certain religious and social ceremonies that always include 
culture specific communication. Values form the core of a culture. Values are the general 
tendencies of preferring certain conditions to others and are often absorbed very early in life. 
Values are positive or negative feelings closely connected to the basic ideas of good and evil, 
moral and immoral, normal and not normal, allowed and forbidden, etc (Hofstede, 2005). 
3.2.3 Cultural Diversity 
There is a danger in the quite common perspective of culture as something stable and 
unchangeable. It is important to remember that culture evolves, it is not homogeneous and it 
actually allows internal variations. (Steers et al. 2010). Furthermore, one must be aware of the 
quite limited set of levels or dimensions often used when defining culture. Culture is far more 
complex, well beyond any general classification. People within one culture belong to several 
conflicting cultures that include profession, education, geography, religion, etc. A countless 
number of variables provide people with different cultural tools often overlapping each other. 
Naturally, every person belongs to more than one culture at a time (Steers, et al, 2010). 
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Cultures are in constant change, both in terms of values and rituals. The basic reason for the 
great cultural diversity is the initial process of adapting to new environments. Along the 
timeline of human existence, through substantial movement and with an expanding 
population, different cultural solutions were simply necessary in order to survive. Add a 
history of natural disasters, war, religious missionary, trade and the creation of states, and the 
reasons of change and cultural diversity becomes quite clear (Hofstede, 2005)  
Within every culture, there are certain aspects that can be put in relation to the same aspect 
within a different culture. These aspects are based on the idea that, from a social 
anthropological view, every society has the same basic set of problems and that only the 
solutions differ. There are five dimensions; distance of power, collectivism versus 
individualism, feminism versus masculinity, avoidance of uncertainty and short- or long- term 
orientation. Together, they form a five-dimensional model of the differences between national 
cultures (Hofstede, 2005). However, Hofstede’s study was only based on one company, which 
may have influenced the end result. 
3.2.4 National and Corporate Culture  
When discussing culture, as in this paper from a company perspective, one must clearly 
distinguish between national culture and organizational culture. Interestingly, although 
limited, there is a connection (Hofstede, 2005).  
Many firms operate across national borders and are not particularly bound by patterns of 
national culture. An organization is a social system of a different form in comparison to a 
national culture. A person is born and raised into a national culture; it is absorbed in the early 
parts of life and in that sense not chosen. Corporate culture however, is often chosen and it is 
limited to working hours and the time a person is involved in the organization. It is 
established to simplify and maximize the process of fulfilling the needs and objectives of a 
company. Every firm has its own corporate culture greatly influencing company behavior, 
quality, costumer orientation, ethical standpoint and corporate responsibility etc. For 
management, culture is widely regarded as a problem area.  
Naturally, national culture is itself immensely complex. An organization is constantly part of 
several cultures, with a diverse set of influences: religions, national culture, corporate culture, 
etc. Examples are numerous. For instance, national culture and religion greatly affects the 
financial system of a country. Holden (2010), mentions local business practices, accounting 
and finance practices as particularly influenced. In several Muslim cultures for instance, 
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Muslims are prohibited from paying or receiving any form of interest since it equals taking 
advantage of the less fortunate. Instead, money- lending is based on a profit sharing that is 
often predetermined. Furthermore, services and products that actually contradict the rules and 
values of Islam are banned from any economic activity. This exemplifies the differences in 
relation to religious influence that in general affect larger parts of the world and not just 
individual nations. However, although religion is shared, differences in national culture 
evidently affect traditions and practices on every level of a society (Holden 2010) 
Holden mentions how German and American firms tend to differ when analyzing investment 
options. Firstly, German decision-making procedures tend to be longer and analyzed from 
payback methods while Americans take faster decisions using discounted cash flow 
techniques. At the same time, Germans seem to prefer more conservative accounting 
procedures and financial objectives as the opposite to American firms which prefer non 
conservative practices. Reasons are most likely found in the individualism contra collectivism 
societies of USA and Germany where the Americans strive to protect the rights of individual 
investors while German firms tend to avoid uncertainty. The examples of national culture 
related differences are numerous. Although these examples present seemingly small 
differences, their potential effect is significantly larger and realizing the issues in relation to 
corporate culture, naturally becomes immensely important (Holden 2010) 
As noted earlier, governments tend to be very protective of large domestic companies. People 
in general seem to have a nationalistic and protective approach to the major firms of their 
countries. In Sweden, this is exemplified by IKEA, Volvo and H&M, three companies that are 
essential to Swedish identity, at home and abroad.  From a national perspective, if it is 
possible to generalize to such an extent, there are certain tendencies that should be noticed. 
For instance, one interesting observation concerns cultural differences and cooperation. Is it 
harder to deal with large cultural differences than smaller ones? Research implies that this is 
not the case. Instead, Steers et al. (2010) think that managers moving between different 
cultures often find it to be reversed and that smaller differences are often overlooked and not 
handled until the damage is done. In a recent joint venture between a Brazilian and Chinese 
firm (two very different cultures), the smaller similarities such as the same economic 
development level and the importance of relationships in business actually worked to unify 
both sides. A recent study showed that Portuguese managers found working with 
Scandinavians easier than with Spaniards or Brazilians, two cultures far more similar to their 
own (Steers et al. 2010). Still, for social interaction, the Portuguese preferred Spaniards and 
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Brazilians to Scandinavians. One Chinese manager commented on the Brazilians and the 
mutual feeling of being on the same level and treating each other from that perspective as an 
essential and possibly far more important factor than the cultural aspect.   This implies that 
there is no good or bad to cultural differences but that it is very dependent on the situation and 
that the outcome is most difficult to predict (Steers et al. 2010). 
Corporate culture can be defined as “the collective mental programming that distuinguishes 
an organizations members from another organizations members” (Hofstede, 2005: 300). 
Obviously, there are certain cultural differences, small or large, between every organization. 
When organizations collide, in the form of, for example, cooperation or M&A, managing 
culture-related problems are often referred to as cross cultural-management.  
3.2.5 Cross Cultural Management 
Cross Cultural Management is a form of organizational knowledge and resource that when 
recognized, could greatly improve the handling of managerial problems and performance. 
Holden (2002) sees three core problem areas in international business regarding cross-cultural 
management issues: the challenges of ethnocentrism (the idea of your own ethnical group or 
culture as a centre force), cultural diversity (cultures and languages, etc) and the cultural 
shock that varies with experience and may be lesser or greater in impact (Holden, 2002). 
Holden also presents core solutions to each problem area meaning adaption as a first reaction 
to culture shock followed by adjustment as a more permanent and positive reaction and the 
development of certain cross-culture skills possibly through training interventions: creating 
the cross cultural manager (Holden 2002: 30).   
Naturally, it would be most satisfactory if one could develop general instructions on how to 
act in order to minimize culture-related damage when integrating two organizations. 
However, this is an immensely complicated matter. As the business environment globalizes, 
cultural differences develop and present themselves in new ways, through new technologies 
and across borders. It is multicultural both from geographical and organizational perspectives. 
Simply put, defining cultural aspects is difficult since it is in constant change. Interestingly, 
today, when culture-specific awareness should be a necessity, it is seemingly often forgotten, 
resulting in misunderstandings and clashes far worse than necessary. Such a cultural specific 
awareness requires great efforts from the organizations themselves. Throughout the 
organization there must be a clear ambition to communicate and build relationships through 
self-discipline and a clear individual responsibility.  
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3.2.6 Culture as asset 
Culture itself must not be viewed as a threat but as an asset or a source of knowledge in order 
to effectively respond to the differences and demands of cross-cultural activities. It is an 
essential part of successfully operating a global market. Hence, well-developed organizational 
knowledge is a great advantage. The term knowledge does not imply scientific knowledge, 
but experience, values, practices, routines and norms. Holden (2002) divides knowledge into 
tacit and explicit knowledge with tacit representing personal “know-how” and context specific 
knowledge that is hard to formalize. Explicit knowledge, described as “know-what”, 
represents knowledge through manuals, specifications, mathematical expressions, etc. Tacit 
knowledge is extremely difficult to copy and is an advantage to any globalizing company. 
One way of gaining broad tacit knowledge is by rotating managers and technologists around 
the world to develop deep local roots and to share expertise (Holden, 2002). Naturally, tacit 
knowledge is something that an organization needs to nurture and protect. Still, there is a huge 
challenge in translating actual experiences into usable knowledge, but also in spreading this 
knowledge across organizational borders (Holden, 2002) 
From an international perspective, there are certain potential problems in the global transfer of 
knowledge especially in connection with merger and acquisitions. Factors such as a natural 
cultural distance, a lack of personal relationships and a lack of trust might very well create 
frictions, misunderstandings and resistance (Holden, 2002). Also, research confirms that 
companies involved in M&A tend to underestimate the difficulties of knowledge transfer as 
they often fail to achieve the expected levels of transfer. The structures and procedures of 
knowledge transfer are simply not good enough. It is also likely to believe that knowledge 
transfer is especially complicated in cross-cultural environments because of differences in 
language, work groups and context. In order to address problems in relation to resistance to or 
slow moving cultural adaption, the parties involved must negotiate and sharing must be 
encouraged and rewarded (Holden, 2002). Firms simply need to be more serious about the 
cultural aspects of integrating activities in cross cultural M&A.     
3.3 Theory on cultural issues in Mergers & Acquisitions  
There are many incentives for companies to engage in M&A but there are also several 
problematic cultural dimensions in need of consideration (Gertsen et al. 1998). In the early 
planning stage of an M&A, the parties involved tend to neglect the importance of culture or at 
least have difficulties handling it properly. Also, the awareness of cultural difficulties appears 
to be more obvious for the actors in the latter stages of an M&A. It is often discussed in 
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literature that cultural aspects need to be acknowledged and evaluated in the early stages. 
However, the literature offers little or no proposals on how to implement an easy and cost-
effective cultural analysis. When potential M&A get noticed by both parties, the negotiation 
usually takes place and the information flow between actors tends to be cut off with the 
exception of public information and the negotiation discussions (Gertsen, et al, 1998). These 
conditions are the main reasons for the difficulties companies experience when trying to 
implement an early stage cultural compatibility research (Forstmann, 1994). According to 
Gertsen et al. (1998) M&A have historically been dominated by four types: 
 Horizontal: between companies in the same sector and at the same production stage; 
 Vertical: between companies at different production stages in the same sector, e.g. 
purchase from suppliers or the retail stage;  
 Concentric: between companies in different but related sectors, e.g. a manufacturer of 
sports equipment and a manufacturer of leisure wear; 
 Conglomerate: between non-related companies 
When engaging in an M&A in the horizontal or vertical category the reasons may be to 
achieve synergy and large-scale effects, contrary to the conglomerate type where the aim is to 
diversify their operations more (Larsson, 1990). The type of M&A and the underlying 
intentions usually decide the extent of the cultural integration, and the importance of 
integration in horizontal and vertical types of M&A is very high as it requires extensive 
interaction and organizational changes. Areas that are affected by integration are typically 
finance, personal policy, marketing and in some cases even joint production and offices 
(Gertsen et al. 1998).  
Gertsen, Søderberg and Torp (1998) further state that the organization expects cultural 
integration after an M&A of some sort, typically a united management style or shared norms 
and values. M&A have historically been thoroughly studied with a strategic-economic focus 
but in recent years, research has switched to aim at more cultural issues. The reasons for the 
new focus can be explained by the low success rates that M&A experience and the need to 
find answers to the obvious problem. The majority of the culture-oriented studies emphasize 
the influence of culture and its impact on the success rate of M&A. However, it is hard to 
measure to what extent it affects the new entity, but it is almost never without significance 
(Gertsen et al. 1998).  
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3.3.1 Acculturation 
When discussing contact between different cultures it is important to mention acculturation.  
For instance, acculturation is when people from different cultures meet by working together 
and reacts or adapt to the other culture. Basically, this is what happens in an M&A (Berry, 
1980). Berry also claims that there is one group that is more of a leader in these situations and 
that its culture will dominate in the end, resulting in an adaption process full of conflicts.  The 
process of change can decrease the level of conflict and can differ from case to case: 
 Assimilation: the non-dominant group relinquishes its identity; 
 Integration: the non-dominant group maintains its cultural integrity but becomes at 
the same time an integral part of the dominant culture; 
 Rejection: the non-dominant group withdraws from the dominant culture; 
 Deculturation: the non-dominant group loses cultural and psychological contact 
with both its own original culture and the dominant culture (Berry, 1980).  
Berry asserts that assimilation is not always the case with culture contact and that it can 
depend on the weak part’s relationship to its own culture and also to the more dominant part. 
The other determining factors are the dominant part’s acceptance to other cultures and other 
cultures within their territory. Malekzadeh and Nahavandi (1988) have developed models for 
different types of cultural adaptation processes for the acquiring and acquired company with  
help of Berry’s conceptual system and with the conception that the acquired firm is the non-
dominant culture.  
They have divided their adoption process into four categories: 
 Integration: The acquired firm is fitted into the acquiring firm, although differences in 
culture are still accepted. This is the optimal way to go if the employees of the 
acquired firm want to keep their culture while still finding the acquirers’ culture 
interesting. The acquiring firm finds this process attractive if it is multicultural and if 
the firms are related.    
 Assimilation: The acquired firm adapts entirely to the acquiring firm. This is the 
optimal procedure if employees of the acquired firm feel no need to keep their culture 
and finding the acquirers culture interesting. The acquiring firm finds this beneficial if 
it is unicultural. 
 Separation: The acquired firm and the acquiring firm either abandon the idea of 
cooperation or find a structure in which multiple cultures can live separately. If the 
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acquiring firm’s culture is unattractive and there is a need to protect that of the 
acquired firms, this is the optimal choice. It is also favored if the acquiring firm is 
multicultural and the companies are not related.  
 Deculturation: It is what happens when the acquired firm finds neither of the cultures 
attractive and in this case the acquired firm falls apart. This might be the case if the 
acquiring firm is unicultural and the companies are not related (Malekzadeh et al. 
1988).  
Malekzadeh’s and Nahavandi’s models have not been tested empirically, but the assumptions 
made are that the management of the two companies must study and evaluate the cultures to 
be able to establish guidelines for acculturation. Furthermore, the investigation of the 
employees of the acquired firm and their attitudes towards both cultures is of great 
importance. The management also needs to decide whether their organization is multicultural 
or unicultural (Gertsen et al. 1998).  
3.3.2 Cultural fit between companies 
Another study that needs to be mentioned is Cartwright and Cooper’s Model of Cultural Fit. 
They look at corporate culture as “the way in which things get done within an organization” 
(Cartwright et al 1992: 56). Moreover, they also define culture as the shared values and shared 
basic assumptions that are often unconscious. Cartwright and Cooper also assert that culture is 
spread through socialization and is not only caused by management (Gertsen et al. 1998). 
They have studied several companies that have experienced M&A with focus on the cultural 
fit in horizontal large-scale integration M&A.  
Cartwright and Cooper (1992) have established a culture typology that they claim describe all 
different types of organizational cultures (Table 1). When these types are mixed in an M&A 
the authors claim to be able to predict the outcome. However, two organizational cultures do 
not necessarily have to be very similar to become successful, but they must be able to 
cooperate. The acquired firm is expected to adapt to the acquiring firm’s organizational 
culture. Cartwright and Cooper (1992) claim that the extent to which personal freedom is 
affected is more important than cultural differences. Has the personal freedom of the 
employees decreased or increased? If the freedom increases, employees generally feel 
satisfied. If they feel that it has decreased, it normally creates cultural problems.  
When looking specifically at mergers, Cartwright and Cooper argue that the distance between 
the two companies is central. Since both of the companies usually want to keep their culture, 
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it is important to have similar cultures that work together. They believe that negotiators 
should use models in order to establish whether or not the companies in an M&A have a 
cultural fit before going through with the deal to prevent M&A that are incompatible. Another 
advantage is that the prior analysis can help to find problems so that they can be avoided 
already in the integration stage of the M&A (Cartwright and Cooper 1992; 1993, 1996) 
(Gertsen et al. 1998).  Cartwright and Cooper also highlight the importance of the right 
management of integration process, since it results in failure despite the fact that chances of 
successful cultural adaption are considered good.  
Table 1 
Source: Adapted from Cooper and Cartwright (1992) in (Gertsen, et al, 1998) 
Power culture has the least personal freedom then Role culture, task culture and personal 
culture are associated with the most personal freedom. The cultural dimensions of M&A have 
been studied in various ways, and the choice of cultural concept seems to be fundamental in 
the process. The majority of the studies that are produced are based on a classic cultural 
concept which is comparatively stable.  Their view is that culture is a system of assumptions, 
values and norms that could be described objectively. This is in line with Berry’s view of 
acculturation as an adaptation procedure, in which the two companies’ controversies are 
reduced. According to Berry this can happen either through assimilation, integration, rejection 
or deculturation. Many studies have the focus on finding models that can explain and predict 
 
Power culture: 
In this culture, a distinct centralization of power is seen. It is often a question of small companies, often with a 
charismatic leader. Decisions are made by management alone and are frequently based on intuition. The wage systems 
are based on the personal preferences of the management, and the employees have few challenges. A distinction is 
made between two types of power culture: 
Patriarchal: The employees regard the leader’s power as legitimate. The leader is seen as kind and protective. The 
employees are treated as children and are badly informed. 
Autocratic: The employees do not regard the leader’s power as expressly legitimate. The leader’s personal 
commitment to the organization and employees is limited; being primarily a question of personal gain. 
Role culture 
It is basically a bureaucracy, where logic, rationality and efficiency have pride of place. What are important are 
functions rather than people, and division of labor is highly specialized. There are many rules and clear limits for work 
areas and authority. The hierarchy is formalized and clear to all. 
Task culture 
The primary emphasis is on the actual tasks to be solved. The nature of the tasks determines how one works. For 
example; in a new high-tech company, the organization is characterized by flexibility, autonomy and creativity. The 
tasks are challenging, but the employees run the risk of burning themselves out. 
Person culture 
The organization is egalitarian and the structure is minimal. The growth and development of the individual is regarded 
as the most important factor. Decisions are made collectively and all information is shared. Person cultures are often 
non-profit organizations.      
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cultural integration difficulties prior to an M&A in order to adjust their integration strategy 
accordingly. However, some recent empirical studies suggest, that integration difficulties 
cannot be analyzed by culture models in advance. These studies also suggest that the 
management of the integration procedure play a crucial role (Gertsen et al. 1998).  
3.3.3 Managing Cultural Differences in M&A with Cultural Fit Analyses 
Forstmann (1998) performed a study in which he evaluated whether or not corporate cultural 
differences can explain problems in the integration phase. He studied a $1 billion German 
chemical company acquisition. The acquired company was North American with headquarters 
in Canada and operations spread out in the U.S, Belgium and France.  According to his study, 
corporate cultural differences can explain integration problems and he asserts that the acquirer 
can manage the cultural differences that have been determined, to make sure that the 
likelihood of success is higher (Forstmann, 1998). Forstmann further developed a 
methodology that managers ought to use in order to successfully integrate the two companies 
culturally. The corporate cultural strategic and competence fit of the two entities are 
considered key factors in order to accomplish a successful merger or acquisition. Hence, 
Forstmann stresses the importance of managers evaluating these issues thoroughly before the 
integration is planned (Forstmann, 1998). According to most management theories there are 
three rational ways to handle lack of fit when handling strategy and competence dimensions.  
1. Adaption of cultural differences to the strategy. The perception that a culture of one or 
both acquisition partners can in fact be changed is certainly widely held, but highly 
questionable;  
2. Adaptation of the strategy to the cultural differences. This would require following the 
paradigm “structure follows culture”; 
3. No adaption of either strategy or cultural differences. This third alternative, known as 
“managing around culture”, tries to circumvent the negative impact of cultural 
differences by, for example, creating a favorable organizational climate (Forstmann, 
1998: 73).  
That approach adds a phase where the acquirer performs an analysis of cultural fit and 
differences prior to the integration phase. There are many researchers claiming that the 
analysis should be performed before any letter of intent or contract is signed, but they do not 
show how that analysis could be performed (e.g. Krystek, 1992; Hofstede, 1991).  However, 
as mentioned earlier, there is a problem with trying to evaluate the culture at that stage. 
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People-based data is usually not available at that stage and the management of the other 
company is generally more open to an in-depth analysis when contracts are drawn. Forstmann 
therefore asserts that there is a short window of time where such an analysis should be 
performed, between the closure of the deal and the integration phase and that the window is 
usually less than one month long (Forstmann, 1998).  
There are different ways to conduct the cultural integration according Forstmann who based 
the alternatives on theories created by Howard Perlmutter in the late 1960s. The four 
alternatives presented are the following: Ethnocentrism, Regiocentrism, Polycentrism, 
Geocentrism. Ethnocentrism refers to a company that prefers a united corporate culture in 
areas where they do business and therefore need large amount of integration, generally 
associated with strong centralized decision making. Regiocentrism refers to a company that 
can be described as multi-ethnocentrism where several integrative cultural zones are allowed 
by the company that is generally multinational. The Polycentric approach is the most 
decentralized version in which the company allows all subsidiaries to adapt their own local 
culture. Geocentrism is a mix since it allows all subsidiaries to participate in the creation of 
the united corporate culture.  
The extent of integration that is necessary will be determined by which alternative the 
management decides to use. For example, companies that apply an ethnocentric strategy are in 
need of a more integrative process than a company that applies a polycentric strategy, since 
they strive to reach a worldwide unified corporate culture (Forstmann, 1998). According to 
Forstmann, the first step in the integration procedure is therefore the process of getting an 
understanding of the preferred culture-transfer strategy, which can be any one of the four 
previously mentioned types. However, most acquirers have not formulated such strategies, 
which might make it more difficult to produce a cultural integration strategy. When the 
culture-transfer strategy is established the next step is to evaluate the cultural differences 
between the companies to be able to make the right implementation of the integration process.  
How managers should approach these difficulties are best described in Figure 1 in Appendix 
A. The probability that there are no significant cultural differences is very rare but in that case 
they just have to integrate as planned (Forstmann, 1998). If significant cultural differences do 
exist, the management has to make further decisions concerning the possibility of managing 
around these issues. The next question that the management needs to evaluate is whether the 
acquired company has the ability to manage the cultural differences and whether integration is 
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achievable under the current cultural circumstances, which is an important step of the fit 
analysis. The matrix that is presented in Figure 2 intends to be used as a tool for managers to 
determine whether integration will be attainable.  
Figure 2: Cultural Fit Analysis: Evaluation of Cultural Differences 
 
Source: Forstmann (1998) 
The categories “importance for strategy” and “level of cultural differences” can be divided 
into low, medium and high. The categories can be considered low if less than 33 per cent, 
medium above 33 and below 66 percent while high if is above 66 per cent. The attitude 
towards where in the matrix the company finds it acceptable to be positioned depends on the 
company’s preferred culture-transfer strategy. For example, a company that has chosen a 
ethnocentric strategy might find the top three squares as unsustainable, while a company that 
has chosen a polycentric strategy might find that all squares acceptable except the top one 
(Forstmann, 1998). If the differences in culture are accepted in the evaluation process and 
they can “manage around” the differences, the management needs to follow the 
recommendations in solution B in the flow chart and to keep three aspects in mind: 
 The attainment of favorable setting within which the modes of behavior desired 
become possible; 
 The selection of suitable employees who are capable of handling the cultural 
differences; 
 The preparations of selected employees through specific developmental programs 
(Forstmann, 1998: 78).  
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However, if the management finds it impossible to attain the goals of integration it might try 
to change one or both corporate cultures which are described in solution C in the flow chart. 
There is, however, a great deal of disagreement in academia with regard to the changeability 
of corporate cultures and the timing of such actions. Lastly, in the worst-case scenario, when 
none of the cultures can be changed, the management is forced to change the objectives of the 
integration or the acquisition as a whole (Forstmann, 1998).  
4. DaimlerChrysler Case Description 
The merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler greatly illustrates the politics, procedures 
and difficulties of a cross-border fusion of such substantial size and of such rare historical 
occurrence. DaimlerChrysler was the result of the largest industrial merger, at the time, in 
history. The merger exemplifies the direction in which the automotive industry was moving at 
the time, and still is today. From a cultural perspective, it offers an important insight into the 
often highly complicated process of integrating two organizations with the aim of creating a 
sum greater than its parts. The parties involved will quite quickly learn the devastating effects 
of underestimating the cultural aspects of a merger or when performed successfully, the 
advantages.  In order to put the events in perspective, the pre-merger situation of each 
company will be presented along with the nature of the industry at the time, the potential 
benefits and the conditions of the merger. Focus is put on cross-cultural issues and the initial 
integration process but the entire DaimlerChrysler marriage will be analyzed, from the first 
contact in the mid-nineties to the divorce in 2009. 
4.1 The Automotive Industry 
In order to understand the reasons behind the merger one needs to recognize the 
circumstances and the environment on the automotive market at the time. The car industry 
experienced a vast overcapacity that for many companies, created an unsustainable situation. 
There are a couple of possible outcomes from this situation. The first one is the most obvious; 
the least competitive companies will not survive, the other option is to produce several 
mergers that will cut the capacity substantially.  
If the automobile industry produced at maximum capacity, the outcome would be 68m cars in 
1997. However, in 1996 50m were made, which is about 73 per cent of the capacity. That 
number can even be lower in parts of the world (50 per cent in Japan). Most analysts agreed 
that in the next five years, world capacity would reach 80m vehicles a year while the demand 
would barely increase to 60m at the most. The future looked dark for many car manufacturers 
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and the solution was to create large conglomerates in order to remain competitive and 
ultimately avoid bankruptcy (economist.com 1997). That view has later been confirmed by 
executives at Ford, Chrysler and Daimler and is the main reasons for the M&A (Vlasic et al. 
2000). 
4.2 Daimler-Benz 
In the summer of 1995, Daimler-Benz issued a humiliating profit warning predicting 
significant losses for the year. When finally quantified, it turned out to be first full year loss 
for Daimler-Benz since the Second World War and the, at the time, largest loss ever reported 
by a European company. Over the past ten years, the attempt of creating an integrated 
technology company had greatly failed, costing Daimler and its shareholders amounts up to 
DM100 billion (Waller 2001, 84) 
Jürgen Schrempp, the newly appointed CEO of Daimler-Benz, knew that in order to survive 
another year, the company needed to focus on its core business and remove any distractions 
from what really mattered. Daimler was to be reinvented from the top all the way down in 
what could be described as a cultural revolution. Keywords were flexibility and shareholder 
value over tradition and hierarchy. Shareholder value was the new priority (Waller 2001). 
Schrempp worked from the idea that “in order to change a major organization you need to 
have a few messages, repeat them day after day and then you have to implement them” and 
continued “I have to repeat the shareholder value message like a broken record – profit!, 
profit!, profit!” (Waller 2001: 157).  
Quickly, thirty-five business divisions were reduced to twenty- three including more than 
sixty thousand jobs. Schrempp initiated a merciless restructuring that continued without any 
glimpse of light until the summer of 1996 when Daimler reported a profit of more than DM 
700 million for the first half of the year. By the end of the year, operating profits totaled DM 
3.7 billion. By 1997, the share price had doubled and full recovery was in sight. Schrempp felt 
that time was right to start thinking about expansion - profitable expansion. Given recent 
company history, diversification was out of the question. Instead, growth was to be achieved 
through M&A (Waller, 2001) 
In the late nineties, the automotive business, a very mature industry, was moving towards 
consolidation with the number of independent actors rapidly decreasing, a change that would 
intensify. In 1997 there were eighteen independent car manufacturers in the world compared 
to twenty- eight in 1980. When analyzing the situation, Schrempp found one obvious partner. 
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Chrysler had the right attributes and a merger seemed profitable from every perspective. 
Together, they would form the third largest automotive manufacturer in the world.  
Regarding the actual products, the companies were very complementary and a merger could 
simplify the long-term objectives of both partners while avoiding large and risky investments. 
The new company would have a very diverse portfolio of products, advanced technology and 
superior economic strength.  Geographically, the fit was also favorable. Daimler had limited 
ability to grow outside its niche in both North America and Asia, in particular on the 
commercial vehicle side. Mercedes-Benz held only small parts of the American market where 
Chrysler was huge. In Europe, Mercedes was strong while Chrysler was weak. Now, both 
would gain access to each other’s markets. However, the Asian presence was still a weakness 
to both companies and would not change in case of a merger (Waller, 2001). 
4.3 Chrysler 
The idea of a merger had already been discussed by Chrysler in 1995, when the largest 
shareholder Kirk Kerkorian tried to make the company private in an unsuccessful leveraged 
buyout. The management led by Bob Eaton as CEO fought fiercely in order to keep control of 
the company and stop the privatization plans. In order to prevent Kerkorian’s plans, one 
option was a merger with Mercedes, which at that time was a subsidiary of Daimler. 
However, this idea was eventually brought to an end, both by Daimler and Chrysler’s top 
management (Vlasic et al. 2000). 
At the time, Chrysler was at a crossroad. Internationally, the company was weak. Although 
sales had increased in the last few years, further international development was not possible to 
reach without help. At home, one was experiencing a huge success as the leading car 
company in the United States. However, recent history had been quite turbulent. From the mid 
eighties, Chrysler had performed an impressing turnaround, moving from an almost miserable 
product portfolio with out of date design and engineering, to the modern design and diversity 
of nineties Chrysler, a change largely dependent on the arrival of Bob Lutz who was the vice 
chairman of Chrysler and the man right under Eaton. Lutz introduced a new approach to 
design, with strong personality, moving away from established patterns. It was new thinking 
that also meant huge risk taking, all in order to survive. Lutz knew that in terms of production 
efficiency and development costs, Chrysler was way behind Japanese competition and 
initiated a close study of Honda and long-term joint venture partner Mitsubishi (Waller, 
2001). Lutz found that current production routines were too inflexible, slow moving and 
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interdependent and that more team-oriented production with a platform for each type of 
vehicle was the key solution. Also, studies of the Japanese car manufacturers showed the 
importance of building long-term relationships with carefully selected suppliers. A new 
strategy was formulated; by 1996 Chrysler would be the number one American car company 
and by 2000, the world leading car company (Waller, 2001). At Chrysler, it was obvious that 
the ongoing consolidation over time was unavoidable. At the same time, organic growth was 
internationally impossible to achieve. It was time to find the right partner (Waller, 2001).  
4.4 The DaimlerChrysler Merger 
The corporate world was experiencing a merger mania in 1998. As mentioned earlier, many 
companies such as Exxon and Mobil, British Petroleum and Amoco, BankAmerica and 
NationsBank, AT&T and TCI, etc joined each other. However, these mergers looked minor in 
comparison to the record breaking DaimlerChrysler merger (Vlasic et al. 2000).    
Most Mergers fail. “In almost sixty percent of cross-border transactions, the acquiring 
company does not earn back its cost of capital” was the message given by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers representatives on a management meeting a few months after the 
deal was signed. The Daimler strategy team had thought of this and closely studied 100 recent 
mergers. Their conclusion was that “they don’t actually fail; they just don’t live up to the 
expectations” (Waller 2001, 244).   
Takeovers were usually performed by strong companies acquiring weaker companies. Here 
however, the conditions were different. Both companies already held strong positions. Hence, 
proceedings could be careful and precise. Still, both sides knew that a merger of this sort, a 
transatlantic merger, needed new ways of thinking.   
The deal was signed just before midnight on May 6
th
 1998.When announcing the deal, 
company representatives followed a well-prepared script consisting of several strong points 
presented in (Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
Carl Egerlundh & Peter Ihre 
 2011-05-20 
Table 2: 
 
This is a great deal – because the transaction will 
 Merge two of the world’s most profitable automotive companies 
 Be a perfect fit of two leaders in their respective markets 
 Bring DaimlerChrysler into a leading position in the automotive industry 
 Position DaimlerChrysler uniquely to exploit new opportunities 
 Not lead to job cuts 
The merger makes excellent commercial sense – because  
 It is a deal of two strong companies, a deal for growth not for rationalization 
 It creates the best portfolio of world-class brands in the industry 
 It combines the technological, marketing and financial strength of both companies 
 It offers benefits through sharing of engineering, manufacturing, purchasing and technology know how 
It will work – because 
 It brings together an outstanding management team with an impressive track record 
 The partners share a common culture of creating value through innovation, quality and customer 
satisfaction and a clear commitment to bottom line performance.  
It will create value through 
 Innovation 
 Global growth 
 Job creation and stimulation 
 Social Responsibility 
DaimlerChrysler – the creation of a leading global automotive company serving 
 Shareholders – it enhances corporate value 
 Costumers – premier brands with excellent potential 
 Employees – new growth opportunities through sales in global markets. (Waller 2001: 178) 
 
 
There was a long road from first contact to the actual deal, with several difficulties along the 
way. The legal aspects of a merger of this kind are extremely complex. It actually took four 
firms of the best commercial lawyers one month only to work out whether the new company 
should be German or American. It turned out to be a German AG company (Waller, 2001). 
However, the end product was a merger of equals with two chairmen running a multi-cultural 
company. Operations in America and Germany were run by the same officers as before the 
merger but positions that overlapped were filled simply by Eaton picking the first and 
Schrempp the second and so on. The result was Schrempp and Eaton as two chairmen, an 
American as president and a German as the chief financial officer. However, when the deal 
was made official, Eaton announced his intention to retire when integration was accomplished 
and to let Schrempp alone run the company as CEO. It resulted in a serious blow to Eaton’s 
power and influence as people perceived it as a loss of leadership (Vlasic et al. 2000). Eaton 
was described as a loner, employees found his management style to be cold, rough, almost 
shy and he was neither a visionary nor a taskmaster. These were attributes people took as 
signs of weakness. Schrempp, on the other hand, was more authoritarian with a strategic 
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mastery of people, a natural sense of timing and astonishing business instincts. He could also 
be very charismatic one minute and intimidating the next, something that only strengthened 
his leadership (ibid).  
4.4.1 A New Decade 
In February of 2001, only three years after the merger, Jürgen Schrempp, then 
DaimlerChrysler CEO presented a 4 billion dollar “turnaround plan” designed to prevent the 
German-American ship from sinking. At that moment, DaimlerChrysler was leaking. What 
was hoped to be a perfect merger with seemingly endless potential now looked more like a 
potential disaster. Evidently, Chrysler was a lot more vulnerable than Daimler had expected 
(Economist 2001).  
There was actually as early as the summer of 1999 major concern for the future of 
DaimlerChrysler, both from analysts and investors. Uncertainty regarding company plans 
along with increased German influence as well as the constant concern for the possibility of 
Chrysler downturn damaging Mercedes Benz caused decreased share value by a third since its 
peak in January of 1999 (Economist 2001) 
To Chrysler, the nineties was a golden decade.  Major and successful investments in mainly 
two niches, minivans and sport utility vehicles, together with the economic boom the 
American car market enjoyed at the time made Chrysler a dominating actor in the automotive 
industry. To Daimler, this was the perfect partner. But soon after the merger, things changed. 
A great deal of internal talent carrying valuable Chrysler specific knowledge left the 
company, most of these people walking across the street to GM or Ford. At the same time, the 
car market began to cool off and Chrysler suddenly suffered from quality problems, failed 
investments in new models, over-optimistic pricing and increased competition. Productivity 
was way behind competitors such as Toyota or Honda, who could build a car twice as fast as 
Chrysler. Fixed costs were far too high. Chrysler was basically on a path to bankruptcy. In 
retrospective, it seems as Daimler not only chose the wrong moment to merge with Chrysler, 
but that the merger had also suffered from mismanagement (Economist 2001). 
Jürgen Schrempp had a dream, an alliance of three major car manufacturers from three 
different parts of the world, Europe, Asia and North America, together creating a modern and 
globally present actor in the automotive industry. Buying controlling stake in Mitsubishi 
Motors in March of 2000 was the last step in turning dream into reality. But only one year 
later, although Mercedes Benz was still profitable, both Chrysler and Mitsubishi were in 
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urgent need of restructuring, including the loss of more than a total of 35 000 jobs (Economist 
2001). Evidently, Schrempp had taken a huge risk. Chrysler was at the top of the market in 
1998 and from there, it was all downhill. Add the culture related difficulties of the integration 
process and you will find a company in trouble. The fight to save DaimlerChrysler continued 
through the early and mid zeroes. Daimler left Mitsubishi in November of 2005 and in 
December, Jürgen Schrempp left, with Dieter Zetsche stepping in as new CEO.  
Schrempp had appointed Zetsche (his protégé) chief of the Chrysler division in 2000 with the 
mission of turning Chrysler around. Zetsche arrived at Detroit headquarters finding a 
shattered company.  As mentioned above, Chrysler was leaking in every department; 
investments were much too high, more than the amounts of twice the size companies such as 
General Motors and without actually improving the product line. Fixed costs were far too high 
and productivity was beyond criticism. Zetsche immediately designed a restructuring plan in 
order to save Chrysler from bankruptcy. Initially, arriving in Detroit was not easy. Zetsche 
brought just a few German managers with him but it was a hostile environment and someone 
quoted Zetsche to be “one of the most hated men in Detroit” at the time. However, the 
situation quickly changed; while implementing the recovery plan, Zetsche worked hard on 
improving the relationship between Germans and Americans focusing on visibility and 
results. He ate lunch in the company cafeteria, parked his car in the employee parking lot and 
greatly supported local charity organizations and community institutions (Economist 2006) 
In early 2002, restructuring started to show results. In the first quarter of the year, Chrysler 
presented the largest profit within the DaimlerChrysler organization. The same period of the 
next year Chrysler doubled its profits while reaching the same level in 2004. At the time, 
Zetsche had earned an impressively strong position in Detroit, both within the company and in 
the community. After five years of leading the Chrysler division, basically saving the 
company, Zetsche was brought home to Germany to manage the serious problems of 
DaimlerChrysler. In Stuttgart, as in Detroit, Zetsche took a cultural approach. Several North 
American managers were given key positions at Stuttgart headquarters. The distance between 
Mercedes and Daimler was dealt with basically by moving top Daimler management into one 
of the old Mercedes factories.  The reason was to destroy what Zetsche described as the 
“atmosphere of them and us” between Daimler-Benz up on the hill and the car business 
people of Mercedes down at the factory (Economist 2006). It was also to serve as a symbol of 
the idea of unity and of “one” automotive company.   
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In late 2006, reports suggested that things actually started to work at DaimlerChrysler. Had 
Zetsche managed to turn the ship around? Evidently not; only a few months later in February 
2007, Daimler announced the possible disposal of Chrysler. Although the previous years had 
given new hope regarding the future of Chrysler, the situation was problematic. Chrysler 
quickly began to suffer from high price of petrol and raw materials and at the same time failed 
in predicting future demand. Things had simply become a lot worse at Chrysler and Daimler 
wanted to drop out.  
In April 2009, Daimler finally ended its relationship with Chrysler. The agreement included 
Daimler freeing Chrysler of its 1.9 billion dollar debt to the German partner and contributing 
several hundred million dollars to the Chrysler retirement funds. This was the final agreement 
of an eleven-year marriage and merger that for years to come will define the difficulties of 
mergers and acquisitions in the automotive industry (Economist 2009).  
4.4.2 Cultural Issues 
In one of the first public speeches Schrempp highlighted the awareness of the issue of 
bringing two different cultures together and he assured that the end result would be a better 
solution (Vlasic et al. 2000). Although the deal was signed in May of 1998, integration could 
not start until November the same year. Early on in the integration process, cultural issues 
were on the agenda and a post merger integration team was formed. It turned out to be a 
difficult matter.  The Germans were eager to show the Americans that they were not plain 
bureaucrats. Several team-building events were arranged in both countries during the summer 
of 1998. Management enjoyed racing cars, picking new corporate jets, eating typical German 
or American food and visiting car museums. Serious integration work did not actually begin 
until late August when the management met for three days. How are we to tackle the process 
of integration? What sort of cultural complications will we face? What do we have to do to 
ensure that this merger is a success? Questions discussed were important and most of all, very 
sensitive (Waller, 2001).  
Chrysler and Daimler reached out to two different customer segments, which implicated 
different attitudes towards the use of funds. Daimler, which produced Mercedes cars, were 
used to sparing no expense in order to create a premium brand image. Chrysler on the other 
hand focused on production of cheaper cars and their organization had a more restricted 
financial policy. That resulted in a different attitude towards the use of funds in the respective 
corporate cultures. Another aspect of the attitude towards the use of funds; German executives 
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where used to five-star hotels and flying corporate jets even for short meetings that could have 
been held over the phone, whereas the Chrysler employees had considerably more financial 
restrictions. Daimler wanted to create a coin with the new logo on to be handed out to all 
employees with the objective of demonstrating a unified feeling. According to Chrysler 
executives, the coins were much too expensive and the dissatisfaction was clear in Germany 
(Vlasic, et al., 2000).   
Further problems occurred quite early on also in the marketing divisions. Daimler and 
Chrysler refused to work together on the grounds that both parts would destroy the respective 
brand with their ways of conducting marketing. The PR departments also had different views 
on how to work. Chrysler was known for its spontaneity, candor and theatrical style, while 
Daimler prized preparations and predictability. One example of controversy was when they 
wrote a copy of the Day One international magazine. The Americans sent a detailed 
description of Chrysler to Daimler, who returned the combined publications with their section 
being twice as long, just before they had to print the magazine. The Americans were furious 
but had to accept it and let it go to press (Vlasic, et al., 2000).   
Cultural complications were immediate. In one meeting, Germans and Americans for some 
reason were asked what they thought of each other. One senior DaimlerChrysler executive 
stated that “It is unthinkable for a Chrysler car to be built in a Mercedes Benz factory. And for 
as long as I’m responsible for the Mercedes Benz brand, only over my dead body will a 
Mercedes be built in a Chrysler factory” (Waller 2001: 161). Waller describes this point of 
view as typical of the German attitude towards Chrysler engineering, which was a problem 
that top management tried to work against. Everyone was to work and act in the interest of the 
company and not from personal agendas. Rüdiger Grube, chief of corporate development and 
Barry Price from Chrysler, together formulated a few principles regarding the Post Merger 
Integration (PMI) 
 Maintain the underlying business while in transition – don’t allow the distractions of a 
merger destroy what brought you together in the first place.  
 Create a “win win” situation – in a merger of equals, everyone stands to gain from 
effective integration.  
 Speed! Speed! Speed! From now on this would be Grube’s mantra. The faster you 
move, the more likely you are to succeed.  
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 Focus on the value drivers – i.e. on the factors that you can identify and control and 
which lead to the creation of maximum shareholder value in as short a period of time 
as possible. Don’t get distracted by the crap.  
 Create a strong culture of personal responsibility – the parties affected should also be 
participating parties, said Grube. Daimler management board members and Chrysler 
executive vice presidents would be expected to be directly accountable for the success 
or failure of PMI projects. (Waller, 2001: 171) 
Grube and Price clearly address quite large issues while avoiding or missing out on the 
smaller but immensely important cultural issues. One must wonder if the potential impact of 
cross cultural differences to the company was actually considered in the merger preparations 
(Waller, 2001).  
There was disagreement also at the top level concerning cultural issues. For instance, 
Schrempp was not keen of Chrysler’s rules against alcohol and smoking and chose to install a 
bar and a humidor in his Detroit office. Differences concerning such seemingly trivial matters 
as humor showed to be enormous. Chrysler had basically abandoned any form of humor 
within company culture where people had actually been fired because of jokes, while Daimler 
culture was very loose and allowing regarding humor (Waller, 2001). Also, decision making 
widely differed between Daimler and Chrysler. For board meetings, the Germans prepared 50 
page documents that would be discussed in detail. The Americans preferred to prepare by 
talking one to one so that very little discussion was necessary (Economist, 1999). Initial 
tension later resulted in shorter documents and more discussion. Regarding salaries, the 
difference was huge. Chrysler had a very generous pay system that included share options, a 
system that was still quite new in Europe at the time. Daimler executives were paid 
significantly less than Chrysler counterparts from structures that were to be equalized (Waller, 
2001).  
The Germans made the mistake of expecting all Americans to be of similar business culture as 
the New Yorkers who were involved in the pre-merger negotiations. New Yorkers tend to be 
more “European” than mid westerns and often with a different business approach. The Detroit 
people at Chrysler were very family-oriented and seemingly not willing to sacrifice important 
family time in favor of long working days or transatlantic travels. In general, the Germans felt 
that Chrysler people drew a clear line between work and private life and in terms of political 
correctness, that Chrysler culture was extreme.  
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On several occasions, seemingly trivial matters led to complicated culture-related 
misunderstandings. In the spring of 1999, Daimler CEO, Jürgen Schrempp divorced his wife 
of thirty five years for the priority of the company, something that did not go well with the 
mid westerns “family first” perspective. On one occasion, a Chrysler secretary chose to report 
a Daimler executive for sexual harassment as he touched her shoulder while politely asking 
her to make photocopies. Another example is when a German executive greatly upset an 
American executive hugging his colleague goodbye after several months of working closely 
together.  Apparently, except for handshakes, physical contact is out of the question between 
colleagues within Chrysler culture. Another German executive was reported for racial 
discrimination as he miscalculated the number of chairs required to get everyone a seat in a 
meeting. One of the persons who ended up without a chair was an African American woman.  
Daimler also expected to find what they had heard was a non-hierarchical culture within 
Chrysler. It turned out to be even more hierarchical than in Daimler headquarters with 
separate dining rooms for each grade of executives. Still, the Germans were very formal when 
communicating with each other, always using titles and family names while Chrysler people 
used their first names. However, Daimler gave in and decided to go the Chrysler way when 
communicating in English. When German was spoken, communication was to be performed 
through traditional procedures. 
Obviously, there are clear cultural differences between both parties. But differences initially 
not regarded as directly cultural, tended to transform into cultural issues. The distribution of 
power among company management is one example. As mentioned earlier, this merger was 
initially planned to be a merger of equals and not an acquisition, even though neutral 
observers always considered it to be the Germans acquiring the Americans. Hence, 
integration, communication and cooperation of the two companies were vital if they were to 
split the work load, control and power in 50/50. Chrysler CEO, Eaton, gradually grew 
detached after the announcement, did not contribute and slowly faded into the periphery.  
Further changes were noticed on the management board. At meetings, German managers were 
more dominant while Americans were more passive, with a few exceptions. Eaton basically 
sat back allowing Schrempp to run the show, which affected the balance of the board. The 
Americans felt less influential since their proposals tended to be ignored without Eaton’s 
support. This created a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Chrysler managers and many 
officers that were considered as cornerstones either quit or had to leave the company. The 
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merger looked increasingly like an acquisition, the Germans started to take over the company 
and the board that earlier had been divided equally by Daimler and Chrysler officers, was now 
dominated by Germans (Vlasic et al. 2000). 
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5. Analysis 
In this part of the thesis, the analytical part, the different parts of the theoretical framework 
will be discussed, compared and put in relation to the actual process and outcome of the 
DaimlerChrysler merger. Firstly, we will discuss the potential problems of corporate cultural 
differences in mergers and acquisitions from a general perspective. Secondly, corporate 
cultural effects on the outcome of the DaimlerChrysler merger will be analyzed. Lastly, 
alternative actions that could have been performed in order to more efficiently handle the 
cultural aspects of the merger will be suggested.  
5.1 Potential Problems of Corporate Cultural Differences in Merger and 
Acquisitions 
In the theoretical framework, we clearly show the difficulties of actually defining culture. 
There are literally hundreds of definitions, many of which are very similar. The notion itself is 
highly complex and although the importance and impact of culture as a societal force is quite 
clear, its direct influence on the outcome of a merger or an acquisition is very difficult to 
analyze. 
Over the last thirty years, consolidation has basically shaped the automotive industry, rapidly 
decreasing the number of independent actors. As a result, there have been a number of major 
mergers and acquisitions within the industry, many of them between firms of different 
national origin and with the most diverse corporate cultures.  
Naturally, as companies operate in an even more integrated business environment, both 
domestically and internationally, increased interaction equals increased cultural conflict. 
During the initial parts of a merger or an acquisition, it is extremely difficult to foresee things 
both sides would like to know in order to maximize the outcome of the transaction. Will this 
company be easy to work with? Have we correctly estimated its capabilities and objectives? 
To any company, these questions should cause great concern.  
As mentioned earlier, research shows that a majority of M&A actually do not live up to the 
expectations. Although the eventual outcome of a merger or acquisition is dependent on 
several factors, the corporate cultural aspects and integration in particular are essential. The 
importance of corporate cultural integration generally depends on the type of M&A. 
Horizontal and vertical M&A usually require more integration, since interaction and 
organizational change will be necessary in order to enjoy desired synergies (Gertsen et al. 
1998). 
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A potential risk, always present, seems to be high management and employee turnover. 
Reasons for the high turnover number may differ from case to case, but the underlying factor 
is the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the counterpart’s corporate behavior. Both 
partners have a long history from which values, routines and procedures have evolved. 
Employees have for countless hours performed tasks and processes in certain ways. The belief 
that their way is the right way is deeply rooted and a sudden change can erupt in 
dissatisfaction and counteractive behavior. Reactions are generally focused against the 
processes of decision making, level of participation in decision making, structure at meetings, 
acceptance of power distribution and more value-based issues such as quality, costs 
orientation, CSR, personnel policy, etc. However, other reasons for dissatisfaction are 
miscommunication through national languages, company-specific internal languages and 
differences in coordination.  
We have identified three problem areas often in connection with differences in corporate 
culture in mergers and acquisitions; firstly, the decision process, secondly, the motivating 
factors and thirdly, the objectives of the parties involved.  
The decision process is significant in any form of cooperation. Differences in routines and 
procedures regarding decision making can create great frustration and increase the distance 
between parties involved. The decision process very often differs between companies due to 
such factors as size, nationality and industry. Naturally, smaller firms often handle decision 
making faster and sometimes more efficiently than larger firms. So when later working within 
a larger organization, what earlier took days or weeks to decide, can suddenly be processed 
for months. Naturally, this can create major differences in terms of short term and long term 
thinking and potentially hurt the company. The procedures of decision making within a 
company are closely connected to the corporate culture. The decision making basically 
defines the bureaucratic nature of the company. This is also connected to the sense of 
“personal freedom” within the organization. From this perspective, it is easy to add several 
potentially problematic situations. For instance, if decision making is particularly slow or fast, 
there will be a tendency of rushing into business opportunities or completely missing out on 
them.  Also, if decision making is slow or inefficient, it is likely to work against creativity and 
flexibility within the company and at the same time scare off internal talent.  
What motivates people can greatly differ between cultures. For instance, although employees 
in most firms want to create a profitable company, some actually tend to care more about 
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economic compensation. Others tend to be more motivated by power and of the company 
situation in terms of expansion and position. This was the case in the DaimlerChrysler 
merger. It should be noted that, at the time, salaries were more equal within Daimler-Benz 
than in Chrysler. The American top managers earned significantly more than German top 
managers, but managers in lower positions tended to earn more than their American 
counterparts.  
Although it was eventually to be dealt with, Waller (2001) described these differences to be of 
motivational character. The Germans simply had a different approach to both company and 
career. Many expected lifelong commitment to Daimler-Benz and although economic 
compensation is of importance, the overall success of the company along with the personal 
career within the organization is even more influential. The Americans were much more 
family oriented and unwilling to give up valuable family time. Whether this behavior can be 
traced to national culture is not discussed in this thesis. Still, the potential conflicts deriving 
from differences in such an important issue as what actually motivates people within the 
organization can be immensely damaging to a company. When motivational factors differ, it 
is likely to believe that ambitions also differ and when ambitions differ, creating a unified 
organization suddenly becomes very difficult.  
When engaging in a merger, which often means a split responsibility, it is very important to 
synchronize the objectives of both parties. As objectives, we refer not only to financial 
objectives also to objectives in terms of organizational objectives, social responsibility, 
identity, values and ethics. Initially, this should not present any significant problem. Both 
firms normally agree on the basic reasons behind the merger and its potential benefits. But 
objectives can change over time. As companies often, to some extent, remain independent 
also in mergers and acquisitions, the situation of each partner at a given time might result in 
different views of what is optimal in terms of future activities. Financial difficulties or 
possible prospects in a new market for one part might not be the top priority to the other part. 
At the same time, sudden strategic or operational changes might conflict with certain core 
values of one part.  
In an acquisition, this problem might be dealt with simply by the dominating part steering the 
ship. However, dealing with such a problem in a merger of equals, is a different matter. 
Shortly after the merger, DaimlerChrysler found itself in a situation where Daimler was doing 
well but where Chrysler was bleeding heavily. Although the Chrysler situation was a priority 
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to the company as a whole, the situation definitely contributed to weakening the view of 
DaimlerChrysler as a unit, both internally and externally.  
5.2 Corporate Cultural Effects on the DaimlerChrysler Merger 
The DaimlerChrysler merger has become one of the most highlighted mergers ever in the 
context of failure. Furthermore, underlying factors such as cultural issues have been raised as 
one reason for the disappointing end result. Looking at Germany and the U.S from an 
historical perspective, this might not have been the ideal composition, but top management 
defied past controversies and viewed this cooperation as a renaissance of the former 
relationship between two great economies.  
Cultural differences were a fact right from the start, even before any contract was signed. 
Both companies are old and incredibly well associated with their respective countries and 
national history. Integration had not even started when lawyers already argued about the 
importance of keeping the company German and American respectively. Daimler and 
Chrysler were terrified that the identity of the companies would be damaged if they adapted 
and became part of a foreign business entity. Eventually, Chrysler accepted the fact that the 
deal would be off if they did not settle with a German AG (the German term for limited 
company or corporation). However, this might have been a mistake for Chrysler since the 
perception was that the merger of equals was actually an acquisition conducted by Daimler. 
Another contributing factor was Chrysler’s settlement with the name. That decision was taken 
as a warning by the Chrysler employees, who were trying to hold on to their corporate culture. 
The merger was of a horizontal type; both companies were of the same production stage and 
in the same sector, the initiatives were based on creation of synergy and large scale effects 
which require a vast amount of cultural integration and organizational change (Gertsen et al. 
1998) (Larsson, 1990). Areas affected by the integration are typically finance, personnel 
policy, marketing and joint production and offices (Gertsen et al. 1998). Accordingly, all 
areas in the DaimlerChrysler case were involved in some kind of cultural clash. The Germans 
had a very bureaucratic organization; decisions were taken after rigorous analyses and several 
meetings with all managers. The Americans had a faster decision-making process with a 
philosophy favoring quick decisions. The most obvious differences in corporate culture had 
evolved from their strategies. Daimler-Benz, which produced Mercedes cars, was used to 
sparing no expenses in order to create a premium brand image. Chrysler, on the other hand, 
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focused on production of cheaper cars and preferred a more restricted financial policy. Their 
vastly different strategies had a large impact on the integration, especially on a financial level.  
The differing strategies lead to further implications, this time in terms of quality. The Chrysler 
managers had earlier suggested that shared platforms for the cars would be a major cost saver, 
which to Mercedes, was completely out of the question as it would dilute its brand. 
Furthermore, Chrysler management wanted to start producing cars in Daimlers European joint 
production facilities in order to share costs and at the same time avoid the cost of a new 
production site. The German executive in charge of the operations refused to have Chrysler 
cars built there even if assembly was separated from each other, on different production lines 
and by different employees. He claimed quality would suffer and that the Mercedes brand 
would be harmed in the end, even though the Chrysler cars, at that time, received higher 
quality ratings than Mercedes. 
Problems occurred quite early on also in the marketing divisions. Daimler and Chrysler 
refused to work together claiming that both parts would destroy the respective brand with 
their ways of conducting marketing. One of the Chrysler managers claimed that the Germans 
looked down on them since they worked with more upscale luxury cars. The managers 
involved had many heated arguments regarding the subject and collaboration was out of the 
question, which led to higher costs since they had to keep two sets of marketing departments. 
Similar difficulties was experienced at the respective PR departments, they had totally 
different views on how to work with PR. Chrysler was known for its spontaneity, candor and 
theatrical style, while Daimler prized preparations and predictability. The two companies, 
which merged into one, were more occupied with keeping their identity and corporate culture 
apart than to cooperate and work towards the initial merger objectives.   
Schrempp and Eaton were well aware of the cultural differences before the merger; however, 
had they understood the consequences of such seemingly trivial issues, the outcome of the 
investigation prior to the merger might have been other. Insignificant issues such as smoking 
in offices, alcohol when working, political correctness, humor, how to greet each other and 
physical contact, formal communication etc., caused a great deal of controversies and 
contributed to the development of a negative relationship.   
DaimlerChrysler had failed with its post- merger integration, and management turnover on the 
Chrysler side was inevitable, which in our theory section is highlighted as a side effect that is 
a reoccurring problem during the integration phase. Many managers felt they did not want to 
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be part of an organization that had changed this much; others did not convert to the Daimler 
way, and were instantly regarded as misfits. What neither Eaton nor Schrempp had realized 
was that the reasons for Chrysler’s success to a large extent, was the work of a few 
executives. Although Eaton was Chrysler CEO for a long time, the company was basically 
run by Bob Lutz and a team of executives. Losing employees in possession of important 
company specific knowledge hit Chrysler enormously. Most likely, this is one of the main 
reasons behind the sudden downturn. 
The gradual substitution of the Chrysler management had clear connections with the subtle 
implementation of the Daimler culture as a more united corporate culture. In this case, as 
Berry (1980) describes acculturation, Daimler seemed to try and push out the Chrysler culture 
and force some kind of assimilation when integration clearly did not work. Obviously, this did 
not end successfully as assimilation is best suited when the acquired firm feels no need to 
keep its culture and finds the acquiring firm’s culture interesting (Malekzadeh and 
Nahavandi). The Americans opposed the way in which Daimler tried to force their corporate 
culture on them since they had no incentives to adapt. Regarding the situation at 
DaimlerChrysler, Daimler’s culture did not work at Chrysler since their way of doing 
business did not work at a company focused on a completely different customer segment. 
Cooperation was out of the question for both companies as long as it was not in line with the 
way they did business and if it could harm their corporate culture. With that in mind we 
believe that forcing corporate culture on to other firms is extremely hard and may only work 
under voluntary circumstances. Moreover, the integration strategy used failed miserably and 
the cultural differences made the business plan unsustainable and was in turn one of the main 
reasons for the eventual sale of Chrysler.        
5.3 Actions to minimize culture-related difficulties within DaimlerChrysler 
As described in the DaimlerChrysler case description and in the previous section, the merger 
suffered from cultural conflict early on. Although the problem was recognized, we believe 
that is was also underestimated. In this part of the analysis, we will present a number of 
actions that could have simplified the integration process and possibly improved the internal 
relations at an earlier stage. Whether this would have an effect on the eventual outcome of the 
merger is hard to tell, but it could definitely have eased the suffering the two companies faced 
during their eleven-year marriage.  
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The DaimlerChrysler merger was, as mentioned in a previous section, of a horizontal 
character, which requires a certain amount of integration and change. However, as both 
Cartwright & Cooper (1998) and Malekzadeh & Nahavandi (1988) claim, two corporate 
cultures do not necessarily have to be very similar in order to be successful, but they have to 
be able to cooperate. On the other hand, distance between the two cultures is to some extent 
central since it usually means that firms cooperate better (Cartwright & Cooper 1998). 
Evidently, DaimlerChrysler had severe problems cooperating cross-culturally and the cultural 
distance may be the reason. The case section features several events where cooperation 
difficulties are clearly present. According to Cartwright & Cooper (1998), this could have 
been avoided had negotiators prior to the merger conducted a cultural fit analysis in order to 
see whether personal freedom was affected negatively. Daimler could best be described as a 
“role culture” when using Cartwright & Cooper’s (1992) description of different company 
culture and Chrysler as a “task culture”. That interpretation would lead to the conclusion that 
employees at Chrysler would have received less personal freedom according to Cartwright & 
Cooper’s (1992), which could be one explanation to the dissatisfaction among the Americans 
regarding Daimler’s corporate culture.  
Prior to the merger Daimler and Chrysler both focused on financial analysis, possible areas of 
collaboration and finding synergies, but little or no attention was aimed at the corporate 
cultural differences and fit. As mentioned in the theory section, prior merger analyses can be 
hard to conduct but that does not mean that it is unnecessary to look at culture. Evaluation of 
corporate cultural strategy and competence fit are very important according to Forstmann 
(1998) if the cultural integration of an M&A is to be considered as successful. Looking at 
Forstmann’s theory’s lack of fit handling strategy (1998), the first and second proposals are 
out of the question since it would interfere with the respective firm’s different overall strategy 
and business plan. For example, neither Daimler nor Chrysler would change their corporate 
culture and they are even less likely to change their strategies. It is more likely that they were 
determined to manage around culture, but that would require a very successful integration 
plan which they evidently failed to perform during the merger. This would require an analysis 
of the cultural fit prior to the integration phase. In this case, a regiocentristic approach would 
probably be suitable since it does not require the same amount of integration processes as an 
ethnocentric alternative. Daimler seems to have tried to implement an ethnocentric approach 
in the case that quite simply failed. Hence, the regiocentric alternative would be more 
suitable, which would allow different strategies and corporate cultures, something which 
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seems to be important to both Daimler and Chrysler. Given that DaimlerChrysler was able to 
manage around culture if a successful integration were conducted, Forstmann (1998) suggests 
a utilization of the capabilities in order to integrate successfully. Provided that integration is 
planned, further suggestions that suitable employees capable of cross-cultural management 
should be selected in order to create favorable settings in which a desired environment can be 
developed.  
The DaimlerChrysler case raises serious questions whether integration of corporate culture is 
possible or not. However, one can assume that some form of cultural prior merger analysis, 
could have given some indications as to whether a merger was possible. The lack of cultural 
analyses prior to the merger is in fact surprising, since Schrempp in one of his first speeches 
talked about the awareness of cultural differences. Claiming to be aware of the problem 
without taking any actions to evaluate the difference can be considered as ignorance in M&A 
of this magnitude.  
We believe that an analysis prior to the merger would give a better view on the corporate 
cultural differences; the analysis could serve as a foundation when assessing the possibilities 
of a merger. A further question that could be raised is whether these analyses should be 
performed in collaboration, since data of this kind can be very hard to attain in the planning 
stages (Forstmann, 1998). Daimler and Chrysler need answers on whether or not they can 
manage around the cultural differences, if this merger is doomed to fail, and if not, how 
should integration be conducted in order to be as successful as possible. We believe that the 
top management at both firms was blinded by all the potential benefits and synergy and that 
cultural difference and its potential disadvantages were basically neglected. 
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6. Conclusions 
This part of the thesis, the last chapter, will simply focus on answering the research question 
and the two sub questions: 
From a corporate cultural perspective, what are the potential problems of cultural differences 
in merger and acquisitions? 
Although the potential problems of corporate cultural differences in mergers and acquisitions 
are most diverse and difficult to define, we have identified three areas of significant 
importance: Decision making, objectives and motivational factors.  
In our theoretical framework, as in the DaimlerChrysler case description, decision making is 
shown to be a natural part of corporate culture. Decision making describes and sometimes 
even defines the nature of an organization. Naturally, when two companies come together, 
both with well-developed corporate cultures, collision might be an appropriate way to 
describe such a situation. Few things are as frustrating as a slow, bureaucratic decision 
process. The opposite situation, when decisions are made fast and with huge risk taking, can 
be just as frustrating when it is not a part of corporate culture and normal procedures within 
the company.  
The second area, the motivational factors, is essential for the outcome of a merger. What 
actually drives the parties involved? What motivates people within an organization is greatly 
connected to the culture. Sometimes, employment in a company is regarded as a lifelong 
commitment. Perspectives tend to be long term and the well-being and expansion of the firm 
is always a priority, sometimes more important than family and private life. Such a culture 
would greatly conflict with a family oriented culture where economic compensation is the 
driving motivator and where one is not willing to sacrifice important family time. In such a 
conflict situation lies potential disaster.  
Objectives concern not only financial or strategic objectives, but organizational objectives and 
the basic identity of the company. Although companies usually agree during the initial parts 
of a merger, things can change over time. There are potential disagreements in future strategic 
objectives but also in ethical standpoints, social responsibility and company identity. These 
factors are strongly linked to the basic values of the company, values that in turn influence the 
corporate culture.  
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In the DaimlerChrysler case, what effects did the corporate cultural differences have on the 
outcome of the merger? 
It is likely that the eventual outcome of the merger that ended with the separation of Daimler 
and Chrysler was inevitable. Evidently, Daimler chose to merge with Chrysler at the wrong 
moment in time and overestimated the potential of such a transaction. But not only was 
Chrysler’s situation overestimated, both firms also managed to underestimate the difficulties 
in relation to differences in corporate culture.  
 A cultural clash was instant in basically all parts of the organization, from top management 
and down. Cultural differences defined problems that concerned decision making, question of 
nationality, financial restrictions and more trivial issues such as alcohol and smoking, humor 
and physical contact. Corporate cultural differences, in combination with a weak integration 
process, quite rapidly caused the loss of a substantial number of skilled Chrysler people 
holding important company specific knowledge.  
We believe that the downturn that occurred shortly after the merger was partly caused by the 
sudden loss of talent and qualified leadership within Chrysler. Furthermore, it is our belief 
that corporate cultural differences caused numerous conflicts throughout DaimlerChrysler and 
that most likely weakened the company in terms of flexibility, internal cooperation and 
objectives. Naturally, these are areas essential to the well-being of any company.  
What could have been done to minimize culture-related difficulties within DaimlerChrysler 
prior to the merger? 
Cultural issues are difficult to deal with, but we believe that an analysis prior to the merger 
would have helped Daimler and Chrysler in the assessment of benefits and risk. In order to 
realize the synergy effects, substantial amount of integration is required since the merger was 
of a horizontal type. The corporate cultures do not necessarily have to be very similar in order 
to succeed. However, cooperation is important and in this case, something DaimlerChrysler 
failed to deliver. Furthermore, an evaluation of the corporate cultural fit would contribute to a 
better understanding, which is important when conducting an integration plan. Daimler and 
Chrysler have vastly differing cultures and strategies and neither of the companies seemed 
likely to abandon their corporate cultures. Managing around culture seems to be the only 
possibility, but it requires a thorough integration plan. We believe that the management in 
both companies was occupied with all the benefits of a merger and neglected the corporate- 
  
48 
Carl Egerlundh & Peter Ihre 
 2011-05-20 
cultural differences. Furthermore, an analysis prior to the merger could have provided 
management with information in order to realize the cultural differences and difficulties. That 
kind of information would be very valuable and helpful when evaluating the potential 
outcome of a merger. 
6.1 Suggestion for further research 
As we conclude there to be certain functions within merging companies that tend to be 
particularly affected by corporate cultural differences, we suggest a deeper analysis of these 
problem areas. Decision making, company objectives and motivational factors are areas of 
special interest to us. Also, we believe that a closer look at the integration process of a number 
of M&A, both successful and unsuccessful, could shed new light on such a highly complex 
transaction. Furthermore, we recommend research on M&A in other industries, in order to 
establish whether similar conclusions can be drawn. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Figure 1: Flow chart for the Management of Cultural Differences in M&A 
Source: Forstmann (1998) 
 
